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South Korean president Myung-bak Lee held a summit meeting with 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the Kremlin in Moscow from September 28 
to 30, 2008. South Korea and Russia issued a 10-point join statement and 
promoted their strategic and cooperative partnership. Presidents Lee and 
Medvedev signed a serial of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) including 
26 articles that included items such as the issuance of short-term visas. Also, 
two leaders addressed the TKR-TSR railroad extension, which connects South 
Korea to North Korea and Russia. Both countries stated that South Korea would 
take part in the Russian economic development program in the Siberian region 
and strengthen energy cooperation.
This diplomatic success has been assessed as having two issues. First, 
Russia and Korea agreed to elevate bilateral relations as a strategic cooperative 
partnership. In September 2004, the two countries entered into a comprehensive 
and reliable cooperation. Second, the Korea gas corporation made an agreement 
with Russia's Gazprom. By 2010, Korea and Russia will conduct a study of gas 
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pipeline construction and establish a final contract. From 2015, South Korea 
plans to import 7500,000t, accounting for 20% of Korean gas consumption over 
the next 30 years. 
I. The Outstanding Feat of Energy Diplomacy? 
The Korea-Russia summit is considered a great achievement in energy 
diplomacy. The Korean government expects South Korean energy problems to be 
solved in the long term. However, it is uncertain that this diplomatic outcome will 
remain successful. On October 17, 2006, Russia's Gazprom made overtures to 
the South Korean national gas corporation. At that time, the Korean government 
planned to import approximately 700t of natural gas via a submarine pipeline 
crossing Manchuria, Dalian, or Vladivostok. South Korea, thus, anticipated being 
able to promptly solve approximately 20% of its energy needs. However, this 
agreement has since been rescinded because of international situations rather 
than disputes of a diplomatic nature. 
The roadmap for energy diplomacy, having concrete and detailed plans 
with statistical evidence, faces serious obstacles. The 2008 Korea-Russia 
agreement contains a proviso regarding transit through North Korea. Hence, the 
pipeline's deal depends on Russian geopolitical strategy and North Korea's 
nuclear weapons programs. Under such unstable conditions, it is not clear that 
pipeline construction is feasible. 
II. Russia's anti-American diplomatic line and the South Korea-Russia 
Alliance
Russia has strengthened its diplomatic strategy that implicates the 
imminent dissolution of U.S unilateral hegemony and the revival of regional 
hegemony since former president Vladimir Putin took office in the late 1990s. The 
Russian government has taken advantage of energy resources in order to carry 
out an aggressive national security policy. Thus, Russia's energy diplomacy 
connects directly with its military and security considerations. Russia actually 
extends control over the European and Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) region by providing pro-Russian countries with natural resources. The 
Russian government has reinforced energy nationalism, as evidenced by the 
nationalization of major oil and gas enterprises. For example, the Sakhalin-II oil 
project operated by foreign companies was forced into termination. The investors 
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who participated in the Sakhalin-III oil project had to sell their shareholdings. 
Moreover, in 2000, Russia took diplomatic revenge for the pro-Western 
policy of Ukrainian president Viktor Yuschenko by stopping Russian oil 
transportation. The Ukrainian government was forced to deliver an open apology 
to Russia. Also, in August 2008, the conflict in Georgia was the result of the US- 
Russian struggle for hegemonic power over the CIS region. Russia regarded 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian area as independent countries, while 
the U.S insisted that the two states were Georgian territories. However, Russia 
attacked Georgia in order to protect Russian residents in South Ossetia. Georgia 
surrendered within two days and eventually admitted that South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were engaged in Russian-controlled areas. These issues show that 
energy diplomacy is an inherent part of Russia's hard-line policy. 
International communities have criticized Russia's aggressive behavior. It 
was expected that the Russian economy would experience a downturn owing to a 
decrease in the price of oil price affected by Russia's attack on Georgia. 
Nevertheless, Russia has expanded its regional hegemony by tying up with 
diverse institutional systems. On October 2, 2008, German Prime Minister Angela 
Merkel and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev took part in a Russia-Germany 
Forum held in St. Petersburg. Indeed, large German enterprises showed great 
interest in the event. At the St. Petersburg Forum, Russian President Medvedev 
declared that the US influence in the world economy had come to an end. Russia 
has also tried to establish a joint effort with OPEC and clearly desires to exercise 
its energy influence throughout the world. 
In the case of South Korea, Russia's nationalized energy policy has 
prevented South Korea from importing 1500,000t of LNG despite the Sakhalin gas 
project with which it had been involved. Russia makes a distinct effort to exert its 
power through energy programs. Under the current international situations, it is 
uncertain whether South Korea, which placed the Korea-U.S alliance and its 
relationship with Russia in the same category, can respond to Russia's 
anti-American diplomatic line. 
III. North Korea's Situations and the Feasibility of Pipeline Construction
Construction of the pipeline alone does not guarantee a profit of $100 
million. Also, the pipeline for energy delivery can easily bring about war. The plan 
depends on North Korea's nuclear programs as well as the relationship between 
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North and South Korea, and that between North Korea and Russia. Unfortunately, 
North Korea has placed a hold on construction of the pipeline. The Korean 
government, thus, shifted responsibility for pipeline construction to Russia's 
shoulders. On September 29, 2008, Lee Jae-hoon, a vice minister for trade and 
energy, said that Russia offered a plan to build the pipeline that will transit 
through North Korea, and promised to engage in pipeline construction and 
negotiations with North Korea.
North Korea thinks that the true diplomatic parties are the United States 
and China rather than South Korea. It is true that North Korea adjusts its foreign 
policies to the all-inclusive Northeast Asian circumstances affected by the U.S, 
China, and Russia. Further, Russia pays attention to any changes in the 
hegemonic structure within the Northeast Asian region while it contemplates North 
Korea's struggle against the U.S. Essentially, Russia advocates the abandonment 
of North Korea's nuclear weapons. However, the Russian government has 
criticized the United States for its unilateral pressure on the nuclear weapons 
programs. Based on its censure of the U.S attitude, Russia indirectly speaks for 
North Korea. Thus, the North Korean nuclear weapons programs present a source 
of possible conflict. North and South Korea have also maintained tense relations 
for a long time. It is unlikely that North Korea's cooperation and Russia's 
promotion of the pipeline will be achieved successfully.  
IV. Diplomatic Communication between Russia and South Korea 
South Korea focuses on Russian energy diplomacy as a priority similar to 
the Korea-US alliance. Yet, Russia has dealt with North Korea's nuclear weapons 
issues under the Northeast Asian strategy. At the press conference, Russian 
President Medvedev said that Russia continued to support the denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula through 6-party talks. Major Russian newspapers, such as 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, have often covered North Korea's nuclear programs, but 
their coverage of energy diplomacy includes one of diverse issues. As well, not 
only did the Russian daily papers report the first visit from President Myung-bak 
Lee in a few words, but the Russian foreign minister briefly addressed an official 
document about the South Korea-Russia summit. As South Korea, thus, becomes 
a minor partner in the consideration, Russia has maintained an indifferent attitude 
toward the summit meeting. 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin delayed a talk with South Korean president 
Lee for 50 minutes because of Putin's interview. Because Putin continues to exert 
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his authority over Russia, his impolite behavior can be understood as an intended 
diplomatic signal, not as the simplified ceremony as it was understood by the 
Korean government. Furthermore, after the Korea-Russia summit on October 4, 
2008, Andrey Klepach, a deputy minister of economic development of the 
Russian Federation, suddenly notified the Korean government not to participate in 
the official signatories of the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) just 30 minutes 
before Putin's emergency call. Instead of him, a Russian Assistant deputy minister 
received the protocol from Kang Man-soo, a South Korea's finance minister. 
V. The Prospect for Korea-Russia Energy Diplomacy 
It is uncertain that the achievement marked by the Korea-Russia summit 
will become a feasible plan. Russia clearly uses energy diplomacy as a tool for 
restraining the unilateral hegemonic behaviors of the United States. Yet, the 
Korean government expects the U.S-South Korea alliance to be restored in view 
of Russian energy diplomacy. Russia and South Korea have different points of 
view in terms of energy diplomacy. Moreover, the U.S Northeast Asian strategy 
can be changed depending on the result of the U.S presidential election of 2008. 
Recent statistics show that Russian national projects, such as economic 
development programs, are beyond the possibility of achievement. Thus, the 
future of the Korea-Russia energy cooperation is not an optimistic one. The 
national gas cooperation agreement of 2008 could follow the failure of its 2006 
gas contract because Russia will construct the oil pipeline crossing North Korea.  
The political power game that is encompassing East Asia will conspire to 
make Korea a weak nation. Korea, a minor country, will no longer be free to 
conduct its diplomatic policies within the hegemonic system. However, Korea can 
find a way out of the difficulty. Under the confined structural conditions, the 
Korean government should understand thoroughly and objectively the gathering 
international situations and build a prudent and realistic diplomatic strategy. 
Moreover, Korea should take a multilateral approach to Russian energy diplomacy 
since Russian Northeast strategy is linked to both national security and energy 
diplomacy.
